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I. INTRODUCTION
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicksl is the Supreme Court's most re-
cent interpretation of the rules governing the allocation of the burden
of proof in Title VII disparate treatment cases.2 In Hicks, the Court
held that a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law for disproving the defendant's proffered
explanation for its alleged discriminatory conduct.3 Instead, the
plaintiff must make the much different and greater showing that the
defendant unlawfully discriminated.4 Hicks plainly establishes that
the question of discrimination is not to be treated differently than
other ultimate questions of fact in the federal courts.5
Hicks marks a step forward in the Court's struggle to develop a
coherent framework for allocating the burden of proof in disparate
treatment cases in a manner that is fair to both plaintiffs and defend-
ants.6 Prior Court decisions dealing with the burdens allocation prob-
lem were plagued with vague and ambiguous language, leading to
major differences in interpretation among the courts of appeals. 7 The
1. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
2. Disparate treatment is the most easily understood type of discrimination prohib-
ited by Title VII. It refers to a claim that an employer is treating "some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977). Proof of discriminatory motive or intent is critical in these cases. How-
ever, under appropriate circumstances discriminatory motive can be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment. Id.
3. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2745 (1993).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2756. In Hicks, the Court reaffirmed what it had said in United States
Postal Services Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983):
[Tihe question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensi-
tive and difficult. The prohibitions against discrimination contained in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy. There
will seldom be "eyewitness" testimony as to the employer's mental
processes. But none of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts
should treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of
fact. Nor should they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying
legal rules which were devised to govern "the basic allocation of burdens
and order of presentation of proof," in deciding this ultimate question.
Id. (citations omitted).
6. Although Hicks only addresses the allocation of the burden of proof in Title VII
cases, the decision is likely to have an impact on other types of cases as well. This
is because the McDonnell Douglas framework has been adapted for use in resolv-
ing claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); the antidiscrimination provision of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988); and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989)(applying McDonnell Douglas to a discrim-
ination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.)
7. See infra text accompanying notes 15-43.
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Hicks decision resolves these difficulties by adopting rules consistent
with the general principles of civil litigation.8
This Note examines the Hicks decision and its likely effects on fu-
ture Title VII disparate treatment claims. The Note begins with a
brief review of the case law governing the burden of proof and then
outlines the facts and procedural history of the Hicks case, including
both the majority and dissenting opinions. The analysis of the major-
ity is supported as the logical and necessary result of two antecedents:
Federal Rule of Evidence 3019 and the Court's opinion in Texas De-
partment of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 1o The potential impact of
the decision on Title VII disparate treatment litigation is also
discussed.
The Note concludes that the Court's decision to predicate Title VII
liability upon an actual finding of unlawful intentional discrimination
was correct both as a matter of law and as a matter of policy. Hicks
does increase the plaintiff's burden in disparate treatment cases.11
8. The Supreme Court has frequently stated its intention to subject civil rights liti-
gation to the same procedural rules as all other civil litigation in the federal
courts. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 769 (1989)(holding that under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, white fire fighters who had failed to intervene in earlier
employment discrimination proceeding in which consent decrees were entered
could challenge employment decisions taken pursuant to those decrees); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, (1989)(holding that civil rights litiga-
tion governed by the "usual method for allocating persuasion and production bur-
dens in federal courts"); id. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting)("Ordinary principles
of fairness require that Title VII actions be tried like 'any lawsuit.'"); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989)(Brennan, J.)("Conventional
rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases."); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 619 (1988)(per curiam)("We do not believe that the
Court may recognize any such exception to the abiding rule that it treat all liti-
gants equally: that is, that the claim of any litigant for special application of a
rule to its case should not be influenced by the Court's view of the worthiness of
the litigant in terms of extra legal criteria."); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 718 (1983). Although many of these
cases were partially reversed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, there was no evi-
dence that Congress intended to exempt Title VII from the general rules and pro-
cedures applicable to civil litigation. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C. (Supp. V. 1993)).
9. FED. R. Evm. 301. The rule provides that
[in all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or
meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of
proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains through-
out the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
Id.
10. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
11. The Court's decision in Hicks can be viewed as either an increase in the plaintiffs
burden or a clarification of the law governing the plaintiff's burden, depending on
one's view of the prior law. Since there is much uncertainty surrounding the
1994] 955
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However, that increase is not inappropriate or unfair. The proper con-
struction and operation of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
mandate that the Title VII disparate treatment plaintiff carry the bur-
den of convincing the factfinder that the defendant unlawfully dis-
criminated.12 To allow the plaintiff to prevail upon a lesser showing
would be contrary to established law and would ignore the Supreme
Court's repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times
bears the "ultimate burden of persuasion."13
II. BACKGROUND
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating against individuals on the basis of "race, color, religion,
sex or national origin."14 Since the passage of the Act, courts have
struggled to develop appropriate standards to evaluate claims of in-
tentional employment discrimination. The Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the problem in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.15 In that
case, the Court established a three-stage framework for allocating the
burdens and order of proof in disparate treatment cases.
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
proving a prima facie case of discrimination. This may be done by
showing that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2)
the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (3) that despite the plaintiff's qualifications
he was rejected; and (4) that after the plaintiff was rejected, the posi-
tion remained open and employer continued to seek applicants from
state of the prior law, this Note does not try to make this distinction and so uses
"increase" and "clarify" interchangeably.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 89-111.
13. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245-246 (1989)(plurality opinion of Bren-
nan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); id. at 260 (White J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 270 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at
286-88 (Kennedy J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989); id. at 668 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988);
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)(citing Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
14. Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1)(1988).
15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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persons with the plaintiff's qualifications.16 If the plaintiff succeeds
in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
in the second stage to "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son" that explains its challenged conduct.17 Assuming that the de-
fendant can meet this burden, the inquiry then proceeds to the third
stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.18 There the plaintiff
must be given the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its
true reasons, but were, in fact, a pretext for discrimination.19
Although the Court's opinion in McDonnell Douglas constituted an
important first step in developing a coherent framework for litigating
disparate treatment cases, it left many important questions unan-
swered.2o One important question concerned the precise meaning of
the prima facie case. The phrase "prima facie case" may be used to
denote not only the establishment of a mandatory rebuttable pre-
sumption, but may also be used by courts to describe the plaintiff's
burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer
the fact at issue.2 1 A major failing of the McDonnell Douglas opinion
is that the Court failed to specify which meaning it meant to attach to
the "prima facie case."
Another weakness in the opinion was the vague way in which the
Court described the burden that shifts to the defendant upon proof of
16. Id. at 802. Although the elements of a prima facie case outlined in McDonnell
Douglas referred to a hiring case, the Court did not establish an inflexible stan-
dard. The precise elements that must be proven to establish a prima facie case
will necessarily vary depending on the nature of the case. For examples of how
the McDonnell Douglas articulation of the plaintiff's case has been modified for
other types of claims, see Spears v. Board of Educ., 843 F.2d 882 (6th Cir.
1988)(job assignment); Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 815 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.
1987)(promotion); Kent County Sheriff's Assn. v. County of Kent, 826 F.2d 1485
(6th Cir. 1987)(transfer); Feazell v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 819 F.2d 1036 (11th
Cir. 1987)(compensation); Johnson v. Legal Servs., 813 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.
1987)(discipline); Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1987),
(layoffs), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007, vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1020
(1988); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communication, 738 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir.
1984)(discharge).
17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
18. Id. at 804.
19. Id. at 804-05.
20. For a more complete discussion of some of the problems associated with the bur-
dens allocation problem, see Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in
Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV.
1205, 1236-42 (1981).
21. The difference is important and legally significant. If a prima facie case creates
an inference of discrimination, and the defendant does not articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason, then a court could, but would not be required to, find
in favor of the plaintiff. In contrast, ifa prima facie case creates a presumption, a
court under the same circumstances would be required to find for the plaintiff. 9
JoHN H. WiGMORE, EVDENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940).
1994]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
a prima facie case by the plaintiff.22 The Court described the defend-
ant's burden as one of "articulating some legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the employee's rejection."2 3 Adoption of the
"articulate" standard resulted in much confusion in the lower courts.
Some courts emphasized the Court's choice of the word "articulate"
and imposed upon the defendant only the burden of producing evi-
dence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.2 4 Other courts held
that assigning such a minimal burden to the defendant was meaning-
less and therefore shifted the burden of persuasion onto the defendant
to prove that its challenged conduct was the result of a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason.2 5
The Supreme Court addressed the burdens allocation problem
again in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters.26 In Furnco, the Court
affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, but then struggled to ex-
plain the exact burden that shifted to the defendant:
When the prima facie case is understood in light of the opinion in McDon-
nell Douglas, it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is
merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate
consideration, and not an illegitimate one .... To dispel the adverse inference
from a prima facie [case] under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only
"articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason."2 7
The Furnco opinion did not resolve the conflict among the lower
courts. In fact, if anything, the Furnco opinion added to the confusion
below by using both "articulate" and "prove" in the same paragraph to
describe the defendant's burden.28
Some of the confusion surrounding the burdens allocation problem
was finally cleared up in the Court's opinion in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine.29 In Burdine, the Court held that the
plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff.30 Thus, once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, a pre-
22. Belton, supra note 20, at 1237.
23. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
24. See, e.g., Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1977); Flow-
ers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1977); Harper v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409,411 (8th Cir. 1975); Sabol v. Snyder, 524
F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975); Gates v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 295-
96 (9th Cir. 1974).
25. See, e.g., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Turner v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977); Ostapowicz v. John-
son Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976).
26. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
27. Id. at 577-78 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
28. Id.
29. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
30. The Court added the additional requirement that the prima facie case be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 253-54.
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sumption of discrimination arises which, if not rebutted by the defend-
ant, requires the court to enter judgment for the plaintiff. The
defendant may rebut the presumption "by producing evidence that the
plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason."31 The defendant is not required to per-
suade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered rea-
sons: "[ilt is sufficient that the defendant's evidence raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff."3 2
After Burdine, it was beyond dispute that only a production burden
shifted to the defendant upon the plaintiff's proof of a prima facie
case.
The Court in Burdine also discussed the "pretext" or third stage of
the McDonnell Douglas framework. The "pretext" stage takes place
after the defendant has met its burden of articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action and has thus suc-
cessfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination created by the
plaintiff's prima facie case.33 At this point the presumption, having
been rebutted, drops from the case and the plaintiff is given "an oppor-
tunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a
pretext for discrimination."3 4
Unfortunately, the lower courts interpreting Burdine reached dif-
fering conclusions concerning the meaning of "pretext for discrimina-
tion" and how it may be proven. The majority of the courts of appeals
interpreted "pretext for discrimination" as pretext in the generic
sense, meaning any fabricated explanation for an action.35 Accord-
ingly, those courts have held that a plaintiff may prove pretext, and
thus prove intentional discrimination, by demonstrating that the rea-
sons offered by the defendant for its challenged employment action are
31. Id. at 254.
32. Id. at 254-55. The defendant must set forth the reasons for its actions through
the introduction of legally sufficient evidence. An articulation not admitted into
evidence will not be sufficient. The defendant cannot discharge its burden
through an answer to a complaint or an argument by counsel. The defendant's
explanation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason must be clear and reason-
ably specific. Id.
33. Id. at 253-54.
34. Id. at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).
35. See, e.g., MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1988); Dister v.
Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1988); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts,
Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Tye v. Board of
Educ., 811 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); Thornbough v.
Colombus & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775
F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985); Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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untrue.3 6 Under this "pretext-only" rule, the plaintiff need not pres-
ent any other direct or indirect evidence of discriminatory animus, be-
cause the court can infer that the defendant intentionally
discriminated based upon the defendant's lack of veracity concerning
its true motivations.
In contrast to the approach taken by these courts, a substantial
minority of the courts of appeals adopted what has been termed the
"pretext-plus" rule.3 7 These courts reject the notion that a plaintiff
can prevail in a disparate treatment case merely by proving the de-
fendant's articulated reasons to be false.38 They interpret Burdine's
"pretext for discrimination" more narrowly to mean a particular type
of pretext or fabricated explanation: one designed to hide the fact that
the defendant unlawfully discriminated.39 Consequently, courts that
adhere to the "pretext-plus" rule require plaintiffs to produce some ad-
ditional evidence beyond that necessary to prove the prima facie case
and the defendant's lack of veracity in order to win.40
36. For a complete discussion of the "pretext-only" rule, see Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HAST. L.J. 57, 71-81 (1991).
37. For a further discussion of the "pretext-plus" rule, see id. at 81-100.
38. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990)("If the
presumption is rebutted, the burden of production returns to the plaintiff to show
that the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual and that
the employment decision was based on a sexually-discriminatory criterion.");
Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965, 975 (7th Cir. 1987)("[Pllaintiffs must
allege and support not only pretext, but also that the [defendant's] actions were
pretext for discrimination based on a prohibited characteristic. .. ."); White v.
Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir.)("Merely casting doubt on the em-
ployer's articulated reason does not suffice to meet the plaintiff's burden of dem-
onstrating discriminatory intent .... ."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); Clark v.
Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983)("[A] simple find-
ing that the defendant did not truly rely on its proffered reason, without a further
finding that the defendant relied instead on race, will not suffice to establish Title
VII liability.").
39. See, e.g., Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988)(hold-
ing that plaintiff must show not only pretext, but also "that those reasons were
pretexts aimed at masking sex or race discrimination"); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600
F.2d 1003, 1018 (1st Cir. 1979)(stating that pretext means cover-up for age dis-
crimination); EEOC v. Clay County Rural Tel., 694 F. Supp. 563, 575 (S.D. Ind.
1988)("[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of not only persuading the court that the
defendant dissembled, but also that the defendant's pretextual reason hides an
unlawful one.").
40. The question of just how much "plus" evidence is required for the plaintiff to pre-
vail in the "pretext" stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework is a matter of
debate both between and within the courts of appeals. At one extreme there are
cases which have held that if the plaintiff proves that the defendant's proffered
reason for its challenged action is false, the trier of fact can, but is not compelled
to, find that the real reason for the defendant's action was prohibited discrimina-
tion. E.g., Visser v. Packer Engineering Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir.
1991). Courts that follow this approach do not have a formal requirement that
additional evidence be introduced. However, it is important to note that a show-
960 [Vol. 73:953
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The divergence of opinion among the lower courts on the "pretext"
issue highlighted conceptual and analytical problems in the Burdine
opinion. One major weakness of the opinion was the Court's vague
and ambiguous description of the plaintiff's burden at the third or
"pretext" stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework. In portions of
the opinion the Court uses language which could support the interpre-
tation of the "pretext only" courts, but in others uses language which
could support the interpretation of the "pretext-plus" courts.4 1 An-
other major shortcoming of Burdine was the Court's failure to provide
substantial analysis concerning the applicability of Rule 301 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court merely cited Rule 301 without
any discussion of the rule's proper construction and application.42
These serious deficiencies set the stage for the Court's decision in St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.43
III. ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER v. HICKS
A. Facts and Procedural History
Melvin Hicks, an African-American, was employed at St. Mary's
Honor Center, a minimum security correctional facility, as a correc-
tions officer from 1978 to 1984.44 St. Mary's hired Hicks as a correc-
tions officer in 1978 and promoted him to shift commander, one of six
supervisory positions at St. Mary's, in February 1980.45
In 1983, the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Re-
sources (MDCHR) investigated the administration of St. Mary's after
receiving numerous complaints concerning the conditions at the facil-
ing that the defendant's justifications are not to be believed raises only an infer-
ence, not a presumption, of intentional discrimination. At the other extreme are
those cases in which "pretext-plus" courts seem unwilling to accept comparative
evidence that shows that the plaintiff has been treated differently from similarly
situated employees. E.g., Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d
1181 (11th Cir. 1984). For a more detailed treatment of how much "plus" evi-
dence "pretext-plus" courts have required, see Lanctot, supra note 36, at 91-100.
41. For example, the Court states in Burdine that
[i]f the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption
raised by the prima fade case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry pro-
ceeds to a new level of specificity. Placing this burden of production on
the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame
the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a
full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981)(cita-
tions omitted).
42. Id. at 256 n.8.
43. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
44. Id. at 2746.
45. Id.
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ity.46 The investigation revealed a poorly maintained institution with
substandard upkeep, inadequate security measures, and no effective
rules or regulations. As a result, extensive changes of supervisory
personnel were made in January 1984. Hicks was retained at his po-
sition, but John Powell became the new chief of custody and Steve
Long was made the new superintendent.47
Before the 1984 personnel changes, Hicks had a satisfactory em-
ployment record. However, under the supervision of John Powell, he
became the subject of repeated and increasingly severe disciplinary
actions. Hicks was suspended for five days on March 3, 1984, because
his subordinates violated institutional rules.48 Later that same
month, he received a letter of reprimand for allegedly failing to con-
duct an adequate investigation into a brawl between inmates that oc-
curred on his shift. In April 1984, Hicks was demoted from shift
commander to corrections officer for his failure to ensure that his sub-
ordinates recorded their use of a St. Mary's vehicle into the official log
book.49 Finally, after a verbal altercation between Powell and Hicks,
MDCHR fired Hicks in June 1984.50
Hicks then filed suit against the defendant, St. Mary's Honor
Center, alleging that St. Mary's had violated section 703(a)(1) of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by demoting and discharging him
because of his race.51 The district court found that Hicks had estab-
lished a prima facie case of racial discrimination; that St. Mary's had
rebutted that presumption by introducing evidence of two legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions; and that Hicks had proved
that St. Mary's proffered reasons were not, in fact, the real reasons for
his demotion and discharge.52 Despite these findings, the district
court held that Hicks had not carried his ultimate burden of showing
that the adverse actions taken against him were racially motivated.53
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit set aside
this determination, holding that Hicks was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law once he had proved that all of the defendants' proffered
reasons were false.54 The court reasoned that because all of the de-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant
part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1)... to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, term, condition, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race.. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1988).
52. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747-48 (1993).
53. Id. at 2748.
54. Id.
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fendants' proffered reasons were discredited, the "defendants were in
no better position than if they had remained silent, offering no rebut-
tal to an established inference that they had unlawfully discriminated
against plaintiff on the basis of his race."55
B. Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Eighth Circuit. Writing on behalf of a 5-4 majority, Justice Scalia
held that "the trier of fact's rejection of an employer's asserted reasons
for its actions does not entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of
law."56 Title VII liability may be imposed upon a defendant only when
the factfinder determines that the defendant has unlawfully discrimi-
nated. Courts may not substitute the "different and much lesser find-
ing that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable."5
7
Justice Scalia stated that any doubt created by Burdine "that falsity of
the employer's explanation is alone enough to sustain a plaintiff's case
was eliminated by United States Postal Service Board of Governors v.
Aikens."5s There the Court said in language that cannot reasonably
be mistaken that "the ultimate question [is] discrimination vel non."59
In reaching this decision, the Court clarified the procedural frame-
work developed in McDonnell Douglas for litigating Title VII claims.
Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, once the plaintiff has estab-
lished, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, a presumption arises that the defendant unlawfully
discriminated.6o This presumption requires judgment in favor of the
plaintiff unless the defendant produces evidence that sets forth the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection and raises a genuine issue of fact
as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.61
Once the defendant has produced evidence of nondiscriminatory
reasons, whether ultimately persuasive or not, it has satisfied its bur-
den of production and has rebutted the presumption of intentional dis-
crimination. The presumption then "drops from the case and the
factfinder must then decide the ultimate factual issue of whether the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."62 To
55. Id. (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993)).
56. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2745 (1993).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
(1983)).
59. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753 (1993)(quoting United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)). Vel non
literally means "or not." BLAcies LAw DICnoNARY 1394 (5th ed. 1979).
60. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
61. Id. at 254-55.
62. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
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compel judgment for the plaintiff for merely disproving the defend-
ant's proffered reasons, argued Scalia, "would disregard the funda-
mental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the
burden of proof, and would ignore the admonition that the Title VII
plaintiff at all times bears the ultimate burden of persuasion."63
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter wrote a vigorous dissent which accused the majority
of abandoning settled law and adopting "a scheme that will be unfair
to plaintiffs, unworkable in practice, and inexplicable in forgiving em-
ployers who present false evidence in court."64 According to the dis-
sent, the Eighth Circuit was correct in holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law for showing that the reasons
offered by the defendant were false. The dissent agreed with the ma-
jority on the first two stages of the McDonnell Douglas framework, but
offered a different view of the third or pretext stage.
The dissent acknowledged that the majority was correct in the
analysis that the presumption of discrimination "drops from the case"
when the defendant meets its burden of producing a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its action.65 However, the dissent asserted
that the defendant's obligation to articulate a justification served an
important function neglected by the majority: "to frame the factual
issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."66 Thus, for the dissent, the
production of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons by the defendant
served the important function of narrowing the factual inquiry to the
question of the defendant's veracity. 67
Consistent with its own paradigm, the dissent also disagreed with
the majority over the meaning of "pretext." In the dissent's view, "pre-
text: means pretext in the generic sense, meaning any fabricated ex-
63. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2745 (1993).
64. Id. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined by Justices White,
Blackmun, and Stevens.
65. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting)(quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981)).
66. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)(quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981)).
67. Id. at 2759 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated:
The majority contends that it would "fl[y] in the face of our holding in
Burdine" to "resurrect" this mandatory presumption at a later stage, in
cases where the plaintiff proves that the employer's proffered reasons
are pretextual. Hicks does not argue to the contrary. The question
presented in this case is not whether the mandatory presumption is res-
urrected (everyone agrees it is not), but whether the factual inquiry is
narrowed by the McDonnell Douglas framework to the question of
pretext.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
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planation for an action.68 To support its analysis, the dissent pointed
to language in Burdine which states that the plaintiff may meet his
burden of showing pretext in either of two ways: "either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely moti-
vated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's prof-
fered explanation is unworthy of credence."69
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Overview
Although the majority and the dissent were sharply divided on the
outcome of the Hicks case, they agreed on the basic structure of the
McDonnell Douglas procedural framework. Under McDonnell Doug-
las, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.70 Once the
plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, the defendant is required to artic-
ulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged employment ac-
tion.71 If the defendant cannot meet this burden of production, the
plaintiff is then entitled to judgment as a matter of law.72 However, if
the defendant does satisfy its burden of production by articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the presumption of
discrimination raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case is rebutted
and drops from the case. 73 The case then moves into the pretext
stage, where the plaintiff must meet the ultimate burden of proving
that the defendant unlawfully discriminated in order to prevail. 74
It was here, at the final or pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, that the majority and dissenting opinions sharply di-
verged. The majority concluded that a plaintiff is not entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law for disproving the defendant's proffered
explanation for its alleged discriminatory conduct.7 5 To prevail, the
68. Id. at 2759-61 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter accused the majority of
rewriting McDonnell Douglas by replacing passages where "pretext" appears
with "pretext for discrimination." Justice Souter expressed serious doubts about
whether such a change in diction alters the meaning of the crucial passages. He
then pointed to language in Burdine that states that the plaintiff satisfies his
burden simply by proving that the employer's explanation does not deserve
credence. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
69. Id. at 2760 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981)).
70. Id. at 2747; id. at 2758-59 (Souter, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2758-59 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2747; id. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2747 ("If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption
raised by the prima facie case is rebutted.")(citation omitted); id. at 2759 (stating
"if the employer meets the burden, the presumption entitling the plaintiff to judg-
ment "drops from the case")(Souter, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
74. Id. at 2747-48; id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2749.
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plaintiff must make the much different and greater showing that the
defendant unlawfully discriminated.76 Thus, a factfinder could infer
the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination from its disbelief of the
defendant's proffered justifications, but it would not be required to do
so.77 The dissent, on the other hand, would mandate judgment as a
matter of law whenever the plaintiff shows the defendant's proffered
reasons to be false.78 The crucial difference in the two approaches is
that the majority requires that there be a judicial finding of inten-
tional discrimination before liability under Title VII attaches.79 The
dissent dispenses with this requirement, using the defendant's men-
dacity, instead, as the basis for liability.
At the heart of the Hicks case is a battle over the proper meaning
of "pretext for discrimination" and how it may be proved. The dissent
argues that "pretext for discrimination" is synonymous with "pretext"
in the generic sense, meaning any fabricated explanation for an ac-
tion. Thus, according to Justice Souter, the plaintiff can prove pretext
for discrimination by disproving the defendant's proffered reasons for
its challenged conduct.80 Under this view, the production of legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons by the defendant not only rebuts the
presumption of discrimination, but also serves the important function
of narrowing the factual inquiry to the question of the defendant's ve-
racity.S1 The employer, in other words, "has a 'burden of production'
that gives it the right to choose the scope of the factual issues to be
resolved by the factfinder."82
In contrast, the majority gives "pretext for discrimination" a more
narrow meaning. According to the majority, "pretext for discrimina-
tion" refers to only one type of concealed motive: a motive based on
76. Id.
77. Id. The Court stated:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity)
may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of inten-
tional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it
noted that, upon such rejection, "[n]o additional proof is required."
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
78. Id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2749. The Court explained in a footnote that "[e]ven though (as we say
here) rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a
finding of discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination." Id. at 2749
n.4 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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unlawful discrimination.83 The plaintiff, under this approach, must
convince the trier of fact that the defendant unlawfully discriminated
before Title VII liability will be imposed.84 A mere showing that the
defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is not enough to com-
pel judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law. This result is re-
quired by the Court's application of Federal Rule of Evidence 301
which governs all presumptions under federal statutes.S5 According
to Rule 301, after the defendant has rebutted the presumption by pro-
ducing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its con-
duct, the presumption drops from the case.8 6 The McDonnell Douglas
procedural framework then becomes irrelevant, and the trier of fact is
required to decide the ultimate question of fact in a disparate treat-
ment case: whether the plaintiff has proven that the defendant has
unlawfully discriminated.8 7
The divergence in the opinions can be traced to the dissent's funda-
mental misunderstanding of the nature and operation of a presump-
tion under federal law. This Note, therefore, adopts the analysis of
the majority as the logical and necessary result of the proper construc-
tion and application of Federal Rule of Evidence 301 to the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine presumption. In support of this position, the Note
advances the following arguments. First, Rule 301 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence governs all presumptions in civil litigation under
the federal statutes, including Title VII disparate treatment cases.
Second, Rule 301 follows the view of presumptions propounded by Pro-
fessor Thayer. Third, Burdine recognized that Rule 301 was applica-
ble to disparate treatment cases and incorporated it into the
McDonnell Douglas framework. Fourth, understanding Burdine ac-
cording to the Thayer view of presumptions leads directly to the posi-
tion taken by the Court in Hicks. Finally, any doubt as to the
correctness of the majority's position was eliminated by the Court's
decision in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v.
Aikens.88
83. Id. at 2752. The majority believes that "pretext" means "pretext for the sort of
discrimination prohibited by [Title VIII" (pretext for discrimination). Id. at 2752
n.6 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 2751. The Court stated that it had "no authority to impose liability upon
an employer for alleged discriminatory employment practices unless an appropri-
ate factfinder determines, according to proper procedures, that the employer has
unlawfully discriminated." Id. (emphasis added).
85. FED. R. Evm. 301.
86. Id.
87. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
88. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
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B. Rule 301 Governs All Presumptions Under the Federal
Statutes
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was intended by Con-
gress to govern all presumptions in civil litigation under federal stat-
utes.8 9 The express language of all draft versions of the rule made
this clear.90 Only presumptions that were specifically created by an
Act of Congress and whose terms conflict with the provisions of the
rule were exempted.91 All other presumptions, whether created by
common law or by judicial construction, are governed by Rule 301.92
In the congressional debates over the Federal Rules of Evidence,
including Rule 301, there was no indication that these rules were not
to be applied to Title VII litigation. Indeed, the language of Rule 301
was modified twice to ensure that the rule would apply to all civil liti-
gation and not apply to any criminal matters. 93 Consequently, the ju-
dicially created McDonnell Douglas-Burdine "prima facie case"
presumption is governed by Rule 301.94
C. Rule 301 Follows the Thayer View of Presumptions
Long before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, legal
scholars debated the proper operational effect of presumptions. Two
primary theories emerged from the academy: one associated with Pro-
fessor Thayer and the other with Professor Morgan. Professor
Thayer's view advocated the so-called "bursting bubble" theory, in
which the sole effect of a presumption is to shift the burden to the
89. 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 68, at
540 (1977).
90. Id.
91. 10 JAMES W. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 301.02, at 111-14 (2d ed.
1988)("If the statute does not declare the effect, [of a presumption] then the
Thayer effect stated in Rule 301 would govern.").
92. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
208 (July 1, 1973); Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 336 (March 1971); MooRE, supra
note 91 301.03[2], at 111-18. But cf. United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F.
Supp. 218, 231-33 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding that the presumption of discrimina-
tion that arises in disparate impact cases from the plaintiff's prima facie case is
outside the purview of Federal Rule of Evidence 301 because it is a presumption
that is otherwise provided for by Act of Congress), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
93. See SuBcoMM. ON CRIM. J., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 1ST
SESS., SUBCOMMI=tEE NOTE, (Comm. Print 1973), reprinted in Rules of Evidence:
Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 221, 256 (1973). See also 9
JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAw § 2493f, at 328 (quoting
18 A.L.I. PROC. at 226).
94. For a more detailed history of Rule 301, see Hugh Joseph Beard Jr., Title VII and
Rule 301: An Analysis of the Watson and Atonio Decisions, 23 AKRON L. REv. 105
(Fall 1989).
[Vol. 73:953
BURDEN OF PROOF IN TITLE VII
opponent to produce evidence contrary to the presumed fact.95 Once
the opponent has satisfied this burden of production, the presumption
is dispelled and the factfinder is required to disregard whatever role
the presumption may have had in the trial. The factfinder then pro-
ceeds to decide the ultimate issues in the case. Professor Morgan's
theory, on the other hand, posits that a presumption shifts both the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion.9 6 This approach
views the use of presumptions as a means of advancing desirable so-
cial policy.
In 1965, Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an Advisory Com-
mittee to formulate rules of evidence for use in the federal courts.9 7
After much debate, the Advisory Committee recommended that the
Morgan theory of presumptions be accepted over the view propounded
by Professor Thayer. This recommendation was accepted by the
Supreme Court and submitted to Congress.
98
The recommendation of the Advisory Committee and the Court
met with considerable opposition from the bench and the bar on the
grounds that a Morgan presumption shifted too great a burden of
proof.99 This led the House of Representatives to propose a rule that
was a compromise between the Morgan theory and the Thayer the-
ory.loo This proposal was severely criticized as unworkable.lol For
example, Professor Edward W. Cleary, Reporter for the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, stated that the House propo-
sal on Rule 301 was probably the only instance in which "what the
House has done has been to make a rule that is just totally unwork-
able. The other disagreements that we have with the House are sim-
ply matters ofjudgment. But this one is not. I think we can say flatly
it just won't do."102
95. JAms B. THAYER, A PRELImNARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
336 (Augustus M. Kelly 1969)(1898).
96. EDMUND M. MORGAN, BAsxc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 36 (1961).
97. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 300[01], at
300-5 (1989)(quoting 18 A.L.I. PRoc. 210-213 (1941)).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 301101], at 301-18 to 301-19 & n.2.
100. The House proposal stated:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by an Act
of Congress or by these rules a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence, and even though met with contradicting evidence, a presumption
is sufficient proof of the fact presumed to be weighed by the trier of facts.
Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 221
(1973). See 10 JAMS W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACMCE 9 301.01 [7], at III-
11 (2d ed. 1988).
101. Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 138, at 48 (1974).
102. Id.
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During the Senate's consideration of Rule 301, substantial support
was shown for the Thayer view of presumptions. It was supported by
both the American Law Institute and the Model Code of Evidence.103
One prominent member of the bar, Richard H. Keatinge, the former
chairman of the California Evidence Law Revision Commission, was
an outspoken supporter of the Thayer bursting bubble theory.
Adoption of the "bursting bubble theory" will encourage the use of presump-
tions ... [Tihe use of presumptions in this manner will still serve to expedite
trials .... The minute controverting evidence is introduced the presumption
should disappear .... Once controverting evidence is introduced the pre-
sumption ceases to have any value. In our California code we have the specific
provision that presumptions are not evidence and they affect merely the bur-
den of producing evidence ... [Ilf we have to make a choice it would definitely
be the "bursting bubble theory," because once the controverting evidence is
introduced, as a practical matter, you know that the jury or the judge is going
to look at both sides of the case anyway, and, as a practical matter, I don't care
how the instruction is given, or how you handle it, both sets of evidence, both
for and against the basic facts, are going to get weighed by the finder of fact
whether a jury or a judge. Therefore, as a practical matter, if you have to
make a choice, the "bursting bubble" is the choice. 0 4
In the face of increasing support for the Thayer theory, the Senate
rejected both the Supreme Court's (and the Advisory Committee's)
Morgan approach and the House compromise rule.1o5 Instead, the
Senate adopted a version of Rule 301 that was essentially the Thayer
"bursting bubble" approach. The Senate version of Rule 301 read as
follows:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by an Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of going forward with the evidence to rebut or meet
the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the
sense of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on
whom it was originally cast.106
The disagreement between the House and Senate on Rule 301 and
other rules was taken up by a conference committee appointed by both
houses. The conference committee eventually accepted the Senate
language.10 7 The Conference Report described in detail the operation
of the proposed Senate version of the Rule:
Under the Senate Amendment, a presumption is sufficient to get a party
past an adverse party's motion to dismiss made at the end of his case in chief.
If the adverse party offers no evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the
court will instruct the jury that if it finds the basic facts, it may presume the
103. WEINsTEiN & BERGER, supra note 97 § 3001011, at 300-5 (1989).
104. Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 138, at 196-97 (1974)(testimony of Richard A. Keatinge).
105. 21 CHAREs A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRo-
CEDURE § 5122, at 571 (1977).
106. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,925 (1974).
107. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7106.
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existence of the presumed fact. If the adverse party does offer evidence con-
tradicting the presumed fact, the court cannot instruct the jury that it may
presume the existence of the presumed fact from proof about the basic facts.
The court may, however, instruct the jury that it may infer the existence of
the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts.
1 0 8
A careful examination of the history of the adoption of Rule 301
makes it quite clear that Congress intended Rule 301 to be governed
by the Thayer "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions.10 9 The Mor-
gan view, which was supported by both the Advisory Committee and
the Supreme Court, was carefully considered by the House and the
Senate and yet ultimately rejected. Indeed, to the extent that the con-
ference committee's understanding can be said to deviate from the
Thayer view, it is not toward that of endowing presumptions with a
greater effect (the Morgan view). Rather, it is toward that of granting
a lesser effect to a presumption in which a finding is not compelled,
but merely permitted ("may presume the existence of the presumed
fact"), when the defendant fails to offer any rebuttal evidence to the
presumption.1'0 Thus, it is beyond dispute that presumptions under
the federal statutes are uniformly governed by the Thayer "bursting
bubble" view of presumptions incorporated by Congress into Rule
301.111
D. Burdine Recognized the Applicability of Rule 301
Whatever doubt that may have existed regarding the meaning of
Rule 301 and its applicability to employment discrimination cases was
eliminated by the Court's opinion in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine.312 Although the Court in Burdine did not provide
much analysis concerning the application of Rule 301, it did essen-
tially describe the operation of a Thayer presumption and cite to both
Professor Thayer's treatise and Rule 301.113 Justice Powell, writing
for a unanimous Court in Burdine, discussed the defendant's burden
under the McDonnell Douglas procedural framework:
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presump-
tion of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or
someone else was preferred for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The
defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons.... If the defendant carries this burden of production, the
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual in-
quiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.
1 14
108. Id. at 7099.
109. See Beard, supra note 94, at 116-26.
110. See Belton, supra note 20, at 1235-36.
111. Rule 301 by its own terms governs all presumptions under the federal statutes,
unless Congress has otherwise provided an exception. FED. R. Evm. 301.
112. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
113. Id. at 256 nn.8&10.
114. Id. at 254-55 (1981)(citation and footnotes omitted).
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This passage, if read in accordance with the applicable foot-
notes,115 leaves little doubt that the Court intended the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine presumption to be governed by the Thayer approach
and Rule 301. For example, footnote eight makes clear that "[t]he
word 'presumption' properly used refers only to a device for allocating
the production burden."116 This is followed immediately by a citation
to Federal Rule of Evidence 301.117 Then, in footnote ten of the opin-
ion, the Court cites Professor Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on Evi-
dence and then explains the effect of the defendant's rebuttal
evidence.118 It states:
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that
the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by the
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by the de-
fendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising
from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences
properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of
whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. 1 1 9
This analysis by the Court shows that the McDonnell Douglas-Bur-
dine prima facie case presumption is governed by Rule 301 and the
Thayer theory of presumptions. 12o Consequently, it is nonsense to ar-
gue, as the dissent does, that "the factual inquiry is narrowed" by the
operation of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine presumption to a ques-
tion of pretext. There is simply no support for that notion under the
Thayer theory of presumptions.
The dissent, whether aware of it or not, is advocating a modified
Morgan presumption. 12 1 By using the defendant's rebuttal evidence
115. Id. at 254-56 nn.8-10.
116. Id. at 256 n.8 (citation omitted).
117. Id. (citing FED. R. Evm. 301).
118. Id. at 256 n.10 (citing JAmEs B. THAYER, PRELMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT
THE COMMON LAw 336, 346 (Augustus M. Kelly, 1969)(1898)).
119. Id. at 256 n.10.
120. The Court also made mention of Rule 301's applicability in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989). There the Court stated that
[tihis rule [assigning the burden of persuasion on the issue of discrimi-
nation to the plaintiff at all times in an employment discrimination case]
conforms with the usual method for allocating persuasion and produc-
tion burdens in the federal courts, and more specifically, it conforms to
the rule in disparate-treatment cases that the plaintiff bears the burden
of disproving an employer's assertion that the adverse employment ac-
tion or practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral consideration.
Id. (citations omitted). The dissent in Wards Cove, while disputing the applica-
bility of Rule 301 to disparate impact cases, agreed that Rule 301 applies to cases
(such as disparate treatment cases) that involve "shifting of evidentiary burdens
upon establishment of a presumption." Id. at 762 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)(citation omitted).
121. In saying that Justice Souter seeks to create a modified Morgan presumption,
this does not mean that he seeks to shift the burden of persuasion onto the party
the presumption is directed against. This is, of course, what is advocated by
those who adhere to the view of presumptions propounded by Professor Morgan.
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to narrow the factual inquiry to the question of the defendant's verac-
ity, the dissent seeks to use the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine presump-
tion as an instrument to advance the important social policies behind
Title VII.122 While the dissent cannot be faulted for its good inten-
tions, Rule 301 does not allow the Court to create presumptions that
operate in the manner advanced by Justice Souter. Only Congress
may advance social policy by creating Morgan presumptions excepted
from Rule 301's purview. Thus, under the Thayer theory adopted in
Rule 301, the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine presumption, like any
other presumption, can have no further effect once the defendant has
satisfied its burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its challenged employment action.
E. Understanding Burdine in Accordance with Rule 301
Once Burdine is understood in accordance with Thayer's view of
presumptions, much of the confusion that resulted from the Court's
use of vague and ambiguous language to describe the pretext stage of
the McDonnell Douglas framework is cleared up. For example, Bur-
dine states that after the defendant has met his production burden,
"the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity."12 3 The dis-
sent takes this to mean that the defendant "has a 'burden of produc-
tion' that gives it the right to choose the scope of the factual issues to
be resolved by the factfinder."12 4 Thus, in the dissent's view, the new
level of specificity referred to is whether the defendant's asserted rea-
son is true or false.125 However, once this passage is read with
Thayer's view of presumptions in mind, the passage is better under-
stood to "refer to the fact that the inquiry now turns from the few
generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to the specific
proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have
introduced.1
2 6
Similarly, the dissent takes the next sentence in Burdine, which
states that the defendant's production burden serves "to frame the fac-
What is referred to here is Justice Souter's assertion that the defendant's produc-
tion burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason serves to do
more than rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. Justice Souter believes that it
also serves to narrow the factual inquiry to the question of the defendant's truth-
fulness, a notion that is alien to the Thayer view of presumptions inherent in
Rule 301. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2759 (1993)(Souter, J.,
dissenting).
122. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2759 (1993)(Souter, J.,
dissenting).
123. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
124. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2759 (1993)(Souter, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id. at 2759-60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2752.
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tual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext" to mean that the only
factual issue remaining in the case is whether the defendant's reason
is false.127 The dissent again ignores the operation of Rule 301.128
Under the Thayer approach to presumptions contained within Rule
301, once the defendant has introduced enough evidence to rebut the
presumption, the "bubble bursts" and the presumption disappears.129
Since the presumption is destroyed, "pretext" is more reasonably un-
derstood in light of the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving that the
defendant unlawfully discriminated against him. This would give
"pretext" a meaning synonymous with "pretext for discrimination," re-
quiring the plaintiff to meet the ultimate burden of showing that the
defendant's proffered reasons were false and that unlawful discrimi-
nation was the real reason for the defendant's action.So
The dissent also relies on language in Burdine which states:
[The plaintiffi now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This
burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she
has been the victim of intentional discrimination. 131
Justice Souter understands this "merger" to mean that the plaintiff
can satisfy his ultimate burden in the case by showing that the de-
fendant's proffered reason was not the real reason for the defendant's
employment action.' 32 However, as Justice Scalia points out, this
"would be a merger in which the little fish swallows the big one." 3 3
Since the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuading the court that the
defendant unlawfully discriminated is the greater of the two burdens,
it seems logical to assume that the plaintiff's lesser burden of proving
the employer's reason to be false has been subsumed by the larger
burden of proving that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Thus,
the burden of proving the defendant's reason false "becomes part of
(and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that
the real reason was intentional discrimination."'134
Unfortunately, not all of the dicta in Burdine can be interpreted
like the preceding passages to support the position taken by the ma-
127. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting)(quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981)).
128. See FED. R. Evm. 301.
129. See generally 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2491, at 289 (3d ed.
1940)("If the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the
judges requirement of some evidence), the presumption disappears as a rule of
law.").
130. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993).
131. Id. at 2759-60 (Souter, J., dissenting)(quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
132. Id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2752.
134. Id.
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jority in Hicks. One passage, heavily relied upon by the dissent, un-
mistakably means that the falsity of the employer's explanation is
alone enough to compel judgment for the plaintiff.35 It states that
the plaintiff may carry his burden "indirectly by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."136 The opin-
ion then cites to McDonnell Douglas for support.13 7 However, a
careful examination of McDonnell Douglas reveals no support for the
Burdine statement.' 38 In fact, as Justice Scalia notes, McDonnell
Douglas says just the opposite: "on the retrial respondent must be
given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evi-
dence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in
fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision."139 Thus, the
Hicks majority opinion is consistent with Burdine to the extent that
Burdine is consistent with McDonnell Douglas.
Another problem with this particular passage from Burdine is
that, if given its plain meaning, it renders whole portions of the Bur-
dine opinion incoherent. To allow the plaintiff to carry his burden by
merely proving the defendant's asserted reason false presupposes that
the defendant's production burden has served the function of narrow-
ing the factual inquiry to a question of the defendant's veracity.1 40
But that is not how presumptions in general, or the McDonnell Doug-
las-Burdine presumption in particular, work under Rule 301. Once
the defendant has met its production burden, the presumption is dis-
pelled (the bubble bursts), and the factfinder is required to disregard
whatever role the presumption may have had in the trial. The
factfinder then proceeds to decide the ultimate issues in the case. It is
not possible for the Court to have adopted both Thayer's approach to
presumptions and this other method of proof. Therefore, Justice
Scalia is correct in arguing that this dictum "must be regarded as an
inadvertence"'41 since the Court in Burdine recognized explicitly that
Rule 301 applies to disparate treatment cases.-4 2
A sober assessment of the McDonnell Douglas line of cases before
Hicks reveals a confused maze filled with vague and ambiguous direc-
135. Id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissentingXquoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
137. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)(citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)).
138. McDonnell Douglas does not say, at the cited pages or elsewhere, that all the
plaintiff need do is disprove the defendant's proffered reasons for its employment
action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
139. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753 (1993Xquoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973)(emphasis added)).
140. Id. at 2759-60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2753.
142. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.8 (1981).
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tives.' 43 It therefore should be no surprise to anyone that neither the
majority nor the dissent are able to reconcile the Court's precedents
neatly. However, the majority opinion, despite the dissent's protesta-
tions, is clearly the best interpretation of the Court's prior cases.
F. Aikens Supports the Majority Analysis
The Court's decision in United States Postal Service Board of Gov-
ernors v. Aikens144 also supports the position of the Hicks majority. In
Aikens, the Court held that once the defendant has introduced suffi-
cient rebuttal evidence, the presumption "drops from the case,"145 and
the factfinder must then decide the ultimate factual issue of whether
the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff. The Court went on
to say that "the District Court... should have proceeded to this spe-
cific question directly, just as district courts decide disputed questions
of fact in other civil litigation."146 The Court quoted the problematic
passage from Burdine which says that the plaintiff may carry her bur-
den "indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation
is unworthy of credence."147 Significantly, though, the Court qualified
the passage as follows: "In short, the district court must decide which
party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes."148 This
suggests that it is not enough for the factfinder to disbelieve the em-
ployer. The factfinder must accept the plaintiff's explanation of inten-
tional discrimination.
This interpretation seems to be bolstered by the fact that Justice
Blackmun, although joining the Court's opinion in Aikens, wrote a
separate concurrence for the sole purpose of expressing the view ad-
vanced by the dissent in Hicks.149 The Aikens majority evidently
thought Aikens meant something different than Justice Blackmun did.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HICKS DECISION
A. The Concerns of the Critics
Notwithstanding the sound legal reasoning behind the Court's
opinion in Hicks, the decision has met with severe criticism.15o Sev-
143. See supra text accompanying notes 14-43.
144. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
145. Id. at 714.
146. Id. at 715-16.
147. Id. at 716 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981)).
148. Id. at 716.
149. Id. at 717 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun was joined only by Jus-
tice Brennan.
150. See, e.g., Sherie L. Coons, Comment, Proving Disparate Treatment After St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Is Anything Left of McDonnell Douglas?, 19 IowA
J. CoRP. L. 379 (1994); Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas
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eral civil rights organizations, as well as the Equal Employment 0 p-
portunity Commission (EEOC), have echoed the concerns of the
dissent and charged that Hicks will be unfair to disparate treatment
plaintiffs.151 For example, EEOC Chairman Tony Gallegos stated in a
letter to Education and Labor Committee Chairman William Ford
that he believed "the decision will have a negative effect on its enforce-
ment efforts and therefore should be overridden" by appropriate legis-
lation.152 Gallegos cited the difficulty in obtaining "smoking gun-
type" evidence in discrimination cases and his belief that Hicks made
it more difficult to draw inferences of discrimination, thereby impos-
ing a direct evidence requirement on the plaintiff. 153 As a result of the
advocacy of the EEOC and civil rights groups, legislation was intro-
duced in both houses of Congress which would change the law to the
position advanced by the Hicks dissent and the "pretext-only"
courts.154
Although Hicks has been characterized by the EEOC and many
civil rights groups as a decision that adversely affects the interests of
disparate treatment plaintiffs, an examination of the critics' claims is
necessary to determine whether this characterization is merely polit-
ical rhetoric or whether it reflects legitimate concerns. Justice Sou-
ter's dissent, as the most complete catalogue of the opinion's alleged
shortcomings, provides a useful vehicle to fully explore these issues
and is used below for that purpose.
The first objection advanced by the dissent is that the framework
adopted by the Hicks majority will result in great unfairness to plain-
v. Green: The High Court Muddies the Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Dis-
crimination Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 385 (1994); Note, Burden of Persuasion in
Disparate Treatment Cases, 107 HA~v. L. REv. 342 (1993); Note, Better for a Dis-
criminatory Employer to Furnish a Phony Reason for its Actions Than to Stay
Silent?, 8 No. 6 Fed. Litigator 168 (1993).
151. For example, attorney Mario Mareno of the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund viewed the Hicks decision as "a giant step backwards" for civil
rights because it would require evidence "something along the order of a smoking
gun." Similarly, Nina Pillard, attorney at the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, stated that "Itihere well may be a need for some restorative legisla-
tion," because "the decision is a blow to effective civil rights enforcement."
Management, Civil Rights Attorneys Differ on Effects of Hicks Decision, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 126, at D26, (July 2, 1993); EEOC Urges Congress to Over-
turn Supreme Court's 1993 Hicks Decision, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 193, at D7,
(Oct. 7, 1993).
152. EEOC Urges Congress to Overturn Supreme Court's 1993 Hicks Decision, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 193, at D7, (Oct. 7, 1993).
153. Id.
154. Senator Howard Metzenbaum (along with Senators Russell Feingold, Harris
Wofford, Patty Murray and Paul Simon) introduced the Senate bill on Nov. 22,
1993, shortly before Congress adjourned for its first session. S. 1776, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993). Representatives Major Owens and Alcee Hastings introduced a
companion bill in the House of Representatives on the same day. H.R. 3680, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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tiffs because it disfavors those "without the good luck to have direct
evidence of discriminatory intent."355 Justice Souter seems to believe
that the majority has imposed a direct evidence requirement on the
disparate treatment plaintiff. However, nothing could be further from
the truth. Hicks clearly states that "[t]he factflnder's disbelief of the
reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is ac-
companied with a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with.., the
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.156 In
other words, a plaintiff who presents evidence that puts the veracity of
the defendant's reasons sufficiently in doubt, has presented all of the
evidence necessary to permit the factflnder to find intentional discrim-
ination. There is no requirement that the plaintiff present direct evi-
dence showing intentional discrimination. It may be inferred from the
defendant's lack of veracity. However, it is important to remember
that casting doubt on the defendant's explanation alone does not as-
sure judgment for the plaintiff. The factfinder must not only disbe-
lieve the defendant's explanation, it must believe the plaintiff's
explanation-that the real reason was intentional discrimination.157
Additionally, Justice Souter argues that Hicks requires the plain-
tiff to "disprov[e] all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a
factfinder might find lurking in the record."158 This suggests that the
inquiry at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework "is
wide open, not limited at all by the scope of the employer's proffered
explanation."159 But this is not true. The inquiry is limited at this
stage to the ultimate question of whether the defendant unlawfully
discriminated against the plaintiff.160 The defendant's production
burden, by forcing the employer to explain itself, serves to focus the
case on the employer's actual motivations. This provides the plaintiff
a full and fair opportunity to create an inference of unlawful discrimi-
nation by disproving the employer's explanation for its action. Thus,
under this design, disparate treatment plaintiffs are not required to
disprove every possible nondiscriminatory reason "lurking in the rec-
ord," but are merely required to persuade the factfnder that the de-
fendant intentionally discriminatd.161
Since Hicks does not require the plaintiff to present direct evidence
of intentional discrimination or to disprove all possible nondiscrimina-
tory reasons "lurking in the record," it is difficult to see how the plain-
tiff would bear an unfair burden. Hicks sets the plaintiff's burden
155. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2761 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
156. Id. at 2749.
157. Id. at 2754.
158. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2749.
161. Id.
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according to general principles of litigation and not according to the
worthiness of the litigants in terms of extra legal criteria. The dispa-
rate treatment plaintiff is treated just like any other civil plaintiff in
federal court and required to bear the same burden: the burden of
proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence. This arrange-
ment is consistent with the Supreme Court's repeated admonition
that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden of
persuasion"' 62 and the Court's intention to subject civil rights litiga-
tion to the same procedural rules as other civil litigation.163 Conse-
quently, it is no more unfair to require the disparate treatment
plaintiff to prove that the defendant unlawfully discriminated than it
is to require the tort plaintiff to prove the elements of negligence.
Another matter which seems to trouble the dissent is that in its
view, the majority adopted a rule for "the benefit of employers who
have been found to have given false evidence" in court.' 64 Under the
majority scheme, an employer can offer a false nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its conduct, have that reason disproved at trial by the plaintiff,
and nevertheless win because the factfinder believed that the em-
ployer acted for an unknown reason rather than a prohibited discrimi-
natory reason. 6 5 The dissent finds this scheme objectionable because
162. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245-46 (1989)(plurality opinion of Bren-
nan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); id. at 260 (White J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 270, (O'Conner, J., concurring in judgment); id. at
286-88, (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989); id. at 668 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988);
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 875 (1984); United
States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)(citing
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
163. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 644 (1989)(noting that this is the "usual method for allocating per-
suasion and production burdens in federal court"); id. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)("Ordinary principles of fairness require that Title VII actions be tried like
'any lawsuit.' "); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989)(Brennan,
J.)("Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases. .. ");
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 620 (1988)(per curiam)("We do
not believe that the Court may recognize any such exception to the abiding rule
that it treat all litigants equally: that is, that the claim of any litigant for special
application of a rule to its case should not be influenced by the Court's view of the
worthiness of the litigant in terms of extra legal criteria."); United States Postal
Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 718 (1983). Although
many of these cases were partially reversed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, there
is no indication that Congress intended to exempt Title VII from the general rules
and procedures applicable to civil litigation. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)).
164. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2763 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
165. Id. at 2764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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it sometimes will allow dishonest employers to escape liability for
their falsehoods.166
While the dissent's objection may have some surface appeal, it
should persuade only those who are unfamiliar with the operation of
presumptions under the federal statutes. A presumption imposes
upon the adverse party the burden of coming forward with evidence to
contradict the presumed fact.167 In disparate treatment cases, the
presumption of discrimination forces the defendant to come forward
with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged conduct
or else face an adverse judgment.168 Thus, under this arrangement, a
defendant who offers a false reason for its action will be in a better
legal pbsition than the defendant who remains silent and offers no
reason at all for its conduct. This is because the false reason rebuts
the presumption of discrimination. Silence does not.
Although this arrangement may seem unfair, it must be
remembered that a presumption is merely a procedural device,
designed only to establish an order of proof and production. The law
employs other means to deal with those who are foolish enough to offer
false evidence in court. 16 9 For this reason, the law books are full of
166. Id.
167. FED. R. Evm. 301.
168. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).
169. The law has both criminal and civil sanctions to deal with litigants who offer false
evidence in court. Perjury can be punished with criminal sanctions by up to five
years in prison, a $2,000 fine, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988). Civil sanctions,
while not as severe, can still be very costly. For example, under Rule 56(g) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ifa court finds that any of the affidavits submit-
ted pursuant to a motion for summary judgment were presented in bad faith or
solely for the purposes of delay, the court can order the party employing them to
pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of
the affidavits caused the other party to incur, including reasonable attorneys'
fees. Any offending party or attorney may also be adjudged guilty of contempt of
court. FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
Sanctions are also available under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Presenting a false nondiscriminatory reason in a motion for summary judg-
ment would likely violate Rule 11, exposing the attorney to sanctions which could
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the violation, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
In addition, to the sanctions previously discussed, attorneys may face discipli-
nary action from their state bar associations for ethical violations. For example,
under Rule 3.3 (a)(2) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it is an ethical
violation for an attorney to knowingly "fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a... fraudulent act by the client."
MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(2)(1989). Similarly, it is an
ethical violation for an attorney to knowingly "offer evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false." Id. Rule 3.3(a)(4).
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procedural rules that place the peijurer, initially at least, in a better
position than the truthful litigant who makes no response at all.170
The operation of the McDonnell Douglas presumption also explains
why the majority scheme sometimes will allow dishonest employers to
win, despite having their proffered reason disproved by the plaintiff at
trial. Under the Hicks scheme, once the presumption of discrimina-
tion has been rebutted by the employer's false explanation, the pre-
sumption has no further effect on the litigation. The plaintiff is then
left to bear the ultimate burden of proving that the defendant unlaw-
fully discriminated. A mere showing by the plaintiff that the defend-
ant's explanation is unworthy of credence is not sufficient for the
plaintiff to satisfy this burden.171 The plaintiff must instead convince
the trier of fact that the real reason for the defendant's challenged
conduct was intentional discrimination in order to prevail.172 This
means that there will be instances where the plantiff will be able to
disprove the defendant's explanation but will have insufficient proof to
convince the factfinder that discrimination was the real reason for the
action.
Once the dissent's objection is understood in this context, it be-
comes clear why the dishonest employer is allowed to win in cases
when the factfinder concludes that the employer acted for an unknown
reason rather than a for a discriminatory reason: the plaintiff has
failed to carry his burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of dis-
crimination. Reduced to this, the dissent's objection becomes nothing
more than a plea to allow the plaintiff to prevail without the necessary
showing that the defendant unlawfully discriminated. Since nothing
in the law would permit substituting for this required finding the
much different and lesser finding that the employer's explanation was
not believable, the Hicks majority was clearly correct to insist that the
plaintiff bear the burden of proving intentional discrimination.
73
170. For example, a defendant who fails to answer a complaint will, on the plaintiff's
motion, suffer a default judgment which could have been avoided by lying. FED.
R. Civ. P. 55(a). Similarly, a defendant who neglects to submit affidavits creating
a genuine issue of fact in response to a motion for summary judgment will suffer
a dismissal that false affidavits could have avoided. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In all
of the above examples, as well as under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
defendant may purchase a chance at the factfinder by presenting false evidence.
However, there are substantial risks involved. Litigants may face both criminal
and civil sanctions if their falsehoods are discovered by the court.
171. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2754 (1993).
172. Of course, proving the employer's reason to be false is a part of (and often consid-
erably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason for the em-
ployer's action was intentional discrimination. Id. at 2752.
173. Id. at 2751.
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B. Impact in the Lower Courts
Because of the vehement opposition to the Hicks decision by the
EEOC and many civil rights groups, it is very easy to overstate the
opinion's impact on disparate treatment litigation. Hicks does make
some significant changes in the McDonnell Douglas procedural frame-
work. However, the manner in which disparate treatment litigation is
conducted will remain, for the most part, unchanged.174
The biggest change will occur in those circuits which, prior to
Hicks, granted judgment as a matter of law to the plaintiff for disprov-
ing the employer's explanation for its action. Plaintiffs in these "pre-
text-only" courts will find their chances of obtaining summary
judgment or a directed verdict greatly diminished.175 This is because
under Hicks disparate treatment plaintiffs must do more than show
that the defendant's proffered reason is false to gain judgment. Plain-
tiffs must show that a rational jury could come to no other conclusion
than that the defendant unlawfully discriminated in order to prevail.
This is because the presumption raised by the plaintiff's prima facie
case has dropped from the case.176 With the presumption gone, the
plaintiff is then left with the burden of proving that the defendant
unlawfully discriminated.177
Hicks does not substantially alter the ways in which employers de-
fend against disparate treatment claims. The employer's defense will
continue to depend on developing and presenting solid evidence to re-
but claims and inferences of discrimination. 178 Employers who offer
complete and credible reasons for their action and effectively under-
mine the opposition's claims of pretext will have the best chance of
winning at trial.1 79
174. Hicks Effects on Litigation are Narrow, D.C. Bar Association Panelists Contend,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at D22, (Feb. 23, 1994). In addition, the EEOC has
determined that Hicks will have only a minor impact on EEOC investigations.
See EEOC Internal Guidance on Hicks Ruling Suggests Minor Impact on Investi-
gations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 70, at D3, (Apr. 13, 1994); EEOC Enforcement
Guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 70, at
D29, (Apr. 13, 1994).
175. See, e.g., Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157,
161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 880 (1991); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d
1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990); Tye v. Board of Educ. of Polaris Joint Vocational Sch.
Dist., 811 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); King v.
Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Green-
ville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 639-40 (5th Cir. 1985); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh
Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984).
176. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
177. Id.
178. See Victoria A. Cundiff & Ann E. Chaitovitz, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks:
Lots of Sound and Fury, But What Does it Signify?, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 143
(1993).
179. Id. at 156.
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On the other hand, the prospects of employers seeking to obtain
summary judgment in disparate treatment cases will depend substan-
tially on which circuit they are in. The majority of circuit courts which
have applied Hicks to summary judgment have articulated a standard
that is favorable to plaintiffs.SO Plaintiffs can defeat a defendant's
motion for summary judgment by merely raising a genuine factual is-
sue regarding the authenticity of the employer's stated motive.
Because the factfinder in a Title VII case is entitled to infer discrimi-
nation from the plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case and a showing of
pretext, these courts have held that there will always be a question for
the factfinder once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and
raises a genuine issue as to whether the employer's explanation for its
action is true.181 This view finds support in language in Hicks which
states that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by
the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion
of mendacity) may... suffice to show intentional discrimination."182
Plaintiffs, in these circuits, will find it easy to get their cases to the
factfinder. By merely raising a genuine issue of fact concerning the
authenticity of the employer's stated motive, plaintiffs can survive the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. This, coupled with the
fact that plaintiffs seeking compensatory or punitive damages are now
entitled to a jury trial under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, may increase
180. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)('To survive sum-
mary judgment, [plaintiff] has to... present sufficient evidence to meaningfully
throw into question, i.e., to cast substantial doubt upon, the [defendant's] reasons
for not hiring him."); Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (11th
Cir. 1993)(holding that the "grant of summary judgment... [is] generally unsuit-
able in Title VII cases in which the plaintiff has established a prima facie case
because of the 'elusive factual question' of intentional discrimination"); Moore v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 812,815 (5th Cir. 1993)("To overcome a motion for sum-
mary judgment... the plaintiff need only produce evidence to create a genuine
issue of material fact concerning pretext."); Thomas v. Ethicon, No. CIVA.93-
3836, 1994 WL 171345, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1994)("A plaintiff may defeat a
motion for summary judgment by pointing to evidence which establishes a rea-
sonable inference that the defendant's proffered explanation for its decision is not
worthy of credence."); Reiff v. Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, 827 F. Supp.
319, 324-25 (E.D. Pa. 1993)("[A] plaintiff who offers reasonably sufficient evi-
dence of pretext along with the elements of a prima facie case will survive a sum-
mary judgment motion."); Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 91 CIV. 0035, 1993
WL 336957 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1993)(holding summary judgment to be inappropri-
ate where the plaintiff has colorable evidence of pretext); Brom v. Bozell, Jacobs,
Kenyon & Eckhardt, Inc., No. 89C7021, 1993 WL 313049, at *6 (N.D. M1l. Aug. 13,
1993)(holding that an employee may avoid summary judgment "by showing that
the employer was motivated by a discriminatory reason, or that the reason given
is unworthy of credence").
181. E.g., Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993).
182. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
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the vulnerability of defendants.183 Given the likelihood of larger ver-
dicts with juries and the increased expense of jury trials, employers
may be more amenable to settlement. Clearly, this development will
work to the advantage of disparate treatment plaintiffs in these
circuits.
Not all circuits, however, have employed a summary judgment
standard advantageous to plaintiffs. In a minority of circuit courts
plaintiffs must do more than introduce evidence that raises a genuine
issue of fact concerning the authenticity of the employer's proffered
reasons to survive the defendant's motion.18 4 The plaintiff must intro-
duce evidence from which the factfinder could reasonably conclude
that the employer acted for a discriminatory reason. Under this ap-
proach, the court does not ignore evidence of pretext, but it determines
whether the evidence as a whole would permit the factfinder to infer
the ultimate burden of discriminatory animus. This standard will
make it more difficult for the plaintiffs to survive the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. Consequently, summary judgment
should continue to be a useful tool to employers in these circuits.
C. The Real Significance of Hicks
The real significance of the Hicks decision lies in the fact that the
Supreme Court has made it clear Title VII is not intended to remedy
different or discriminatory treatment alone, but only discrimination
that is proven to be based upon the plaintiff's protected status.18 5
Merely being a member of a protected class and suffering an adverse
employment action is not sufficient to prove discrimination under Ti-
tle VII.186 It must be demonstrated that the adverse action was the
result of discrimination based upon protected class characteristics. 187
183. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1988), provides that any party may
demand a trial by jury if a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages.
184. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842 (1st. Cir. 1993)(de-
feating summary judgment requires "not only 'minimally sufficient evidence of
pretext,' but evidence that overall reasonably supports a finding of discriminatory
animus") (quoting Goldman v. First Natl Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1117
(1st Cir. 1993)); Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc.,'5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir.
1993)(stating that plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to establish that the
defendant's reasons were pretexts for age discrimination).
185. Damages are awarded under Title VII "only against employers who are proven to
have taken adverse employment action by reason of... race [or other protected
characteristic]." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993).
186. See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1992). In Flasher, the
court stated that "the plaintiff must prove that the disparity in treatment was
based upon the plaintiff's race, religion, sex, or national origin rather than upon
either a valid nondiscriminatory reason or upon no particular reason at all." Id
at 1319.
187. Id.
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By insisting upon this basic requirement for Title VII liability, Hicks
repudiates some longstanding but mistaken notions held by courts
and commentators.
The most important of these notions finds its roots in Furnco,
where the Court explained why proof of a prima facie case raised a
presumption of discrimination against the defendant.188 The Court
reasoned that "when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant
have been eliminated... it is more likely than not the employer, who
we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on
an impermissible consideration such as race."19 Although this line of
reasoning was offered by the Court in Furnco for the limited purpose
of justifying the practice of imposing a presumption of discrimination
against the defendant upon proof of the plaintiff's prima facie case, it
has often been misapplied to the pretext stage of the McDonnell Doug-
las framework.19 0 Courts that have made this mistake insist that the
defendant's explanations and motives be viewed with suspicion, even
at the pretext stage of the proceedings.19- This view was explicitly
rejected in Hicks.192 The Court made it clear that once the presump-
tion of discrimination has been rebutted by the defendant, it can have
no further effect on the litigation. Thus, the only assumptions about
the employer's conduct that the factfinder should indulge are those
indicated by the evidence in the case and the inferences drawn from
the evidence in light of the factfinder's experience.
Another mistaken idea repudiated by Hicks was the idea that Title
VII liability can be imposed on employers if their articulated reason is
188. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
189. Id.
190. The Court in Furnco explained that "[a] prima facie case under McDonnell Doug-
las raises an inference [presumption] of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the con-
sideration of impermissible factors." Id. (citation omitted).
191. One of the best examples of the misapplication of the Furnco reasoning to the
pretext stage is Judge Adams' opinion in Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel
Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, (3d Cir.)(Adams, J., dissenting on other grounds), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984). It states:
The Furnco presumption benefits a plaintiff at both the first and third
steps of the McDonnell Douglas test. Assisted by the suspicion that ac-
companies unexplained employer actions, the plaintiff may establish a
prima facie case simply by showing membership in the protected class,
qualification for the job, and unfavorable treatment in comparison with
someone outside the protected class. But once the employer comes for-
ward with evidence that the discharge was motivated by a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff may respond with indirect proof
of discrimination, aided again by the Furnco suspicion of employer
motive.
Id. at 1400. See also Ibrahim v. New York State Dep't of Health, 904 F.2d 161,
168 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that plaintiffmet his ultimate burden of persuasion by
demonstrating that the defendant's proferred explanation was pretext).
192. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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"arbitrary" or is not "business-related." According to some courts and
commentators, 193 reasons that are arbitrary or not related to business
interests do not satisfy the defendant's burden because they are not
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons as contemplated by McDonnell
Douglas.194 Thus, under this view some reasons offered by the de-
fendant to explain its conduct would not be sufficiently strong to "meet
and refute" the plaintiff's prima facie case.' 95 For example, if an em-
ployer offered an explanation of nepotism to explain its actions, it
would not be considered a legitimate reason and would not rebut the
presumption of discrimination generated by the plaintiff's prima facie
case.196 In short, the defendant would be in same position as it would
have been had it chosen to remain silent and not offer any reason at
all.
However, Hicks flatly rejected this requirement of business ration-
ality. An employer can satisfy its burden of production by merely "in-
troduc[ing] evidence which, taken as true, would permit the
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action."197 This means that any reason supported by the evidence and
not prohibited by Title VII is a lawful justification for an adverse em-
193. See Brown v. Tennessee, 693 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 1982)(holding that refusal to
take polygraph is legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, "at least when polygraph
testing is a lawful method for determining employment-related questions");
Miller v. WLFI Radio, Inc., 687 F.2d 136, 138 (6th Cir. 1982)(stating that em-
ployer's burden is to produce "business reasons"); Valdez v. Church's Fried
Chicken, 638 F. Supp. 596, 634 (W.D. Tex. 1988)("If illegitimate reasons such as
nepotism or irrational personal dislike unrelated to job performance were deemed
sufficient to rebut the plaintiff's case, the plaintiff would face an impossible task
in demonstrating pretext."); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1285 (E.D.N.C.
1987)("For the employer's reason to be deemed sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption against him, it must have a rational connection with business goal of
securing a competent and trustworthy work force."); Grabb v. Bendix Corp., 666
F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (N.D. Ind. 1986)("It is not the courts duty to determine the
validity of a defendant's employment decision as long as the decision was made in
good faith."); Hannah A. Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact
and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After
Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. RHv. 419, 437 (1982)("For the employer's reason
to be deemed sufficient to overcome the presumption against him, it must have a
connection with the business goal of securing a competent and trustworthy work
force."); Mack A. Player, Defining "Legitimacy" in Disparate Treatment Cases:
Motivational Inferences as a Talisman for Analysis, 36 MERCER L. RHv. 855, 884-
85 (1985)("Arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons are incapable of supporting a rea-
sonable inference of legal motivation, and for this reason arbitrariness cannot be
legitimate.").
194. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
195. Player, supra note 193, at 884.
196. See Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1983)(Ad-
ams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams argued that nepotism would not be a legiti-
mate reason and would not carry the defendant's burden. The plaintiff's prima
facie case would not be rebutted. Id.
197. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 (1993).
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ployment action under Title VII. Even discrimination not prohibited
by Title VII, such as age discrimination, would be an acceptable de-
fense to Title VII liability.19 s Otherwise, Title VII would become a
statute requiring employers to show good cause or business related-
ness to justify their employment actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
By articulating a coherent set of rules to govern the allocation of
the burden of proof in disparate treatment cases, Hicks marks a major
step forward in the Court's employment discrimination jurisprudence.
Under the Court's approach, the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment
as a matter of law for disproving the defendant's proffered explanation
for its challenged conduct.' 9 s Rather, the plaintiff must make the
much different and greater showing that the defendant unlawfully
discriminated in order to prevail.2 00 The Court's decision simplifies
the McDonnell Douglas framework by conforming disparate treatment
litigation to the same procedural rules as all other civil litigation in
the federal courts. Hicks plainly establishes that courts are not to
treat the question of discrimination differently than any other ulti-
mate question of fact.
The Court's decision to predicate Title VII liability upon an actual
finding of unlawful intentional discrimination was correct both as a
matter of law and as a matter of policy. It was correct as a matter of
law because the proper construction of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence mandates that the presumption of discrimination created
by the plaintiff's prima facie case be dispelled when the defendant has
met its production burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its action.20 With the presumption dispelled, it has no
further effect upon the litigation and the only issue remaining for the
factfinder is whether the defendant unlawfully discriminated against
the plaintiff.202 Consistent with the Supreme Court's repeated admo-
nition, the plaintiff bears this "ultimate burden of persuasion."
20 3
198. An employer who offered age discrimination as its explanation for its adverse
employment action may escape Title VII liability. However, its defense could be
used as an admission in a subsequent age discrimination case brought under the
ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
199. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
200. Id.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 89-143.
202. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
203. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245-46 (1989)(plurality opinion of Bren-
nan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); id. at 260 (White J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 270 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at
286-88 (Kennedy J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting); Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989); id. at 668 (Stevens, J.,
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Basing Title VII liability upon an actual finding of discrimination
was also the correct policy to follow. In contemporary society, finding
an employer guilty of invidious discrimination means more than a
mere violation of the law; it is a violation of one of the most deeply
held moral norms of the community. As Professor Richard Epstein
has observed, "[there is little question that a broad antidiscrimina-
tion principle lies at the core of American political and intellectual un-
derstandings of a just and proper society, not only in employment but
... in all areas of public and private life."204 Given that those found
liable of a Title VII violation often face the vehement moral condemna-
tion of the community in addition to legal sanctions, justice demands
that some steps be taken to avoid moral mistakes and ensure that in-
nocent employers are not harmed by faulty factfinding.2O5 Hicks pro-
vides some added assurance of accurate factfinding by requiring an
actual finding of unlawful discrimination before Title VII liability can
be proved.
As then Circuit Judge Scalia recognized, "the question facing triers
of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. The rea-
son it is sensitive is that without careful and conscientious factfinding
dissenting); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988);
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)(citing Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
204. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROuNDs: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMNATION LAws 1 (1992). Professor Epstein also notes that the "consensus in
favor of the [antidiscrimination] principle is as wide as it is deep." Id.
205. Consider, for example, the highly publicized lawsuit against Denny's filed by six
African-American Secret Service agents, who claim they were denied service at a
Denny's restaurant in Annapolis, Maryland. The lawsuit ignited a firestorm of
negative publicity and public condemnation. In an attempt to make up for the
incident and repair its image, Denny's parent company, Flagstar, signed an
agreement with the NAACP. Flagstar agreed to increase employment and man-
agement opportunities for minorities and increase the amount of business it does
with minority-owned suppliers. NAACP leaders called the agreement a "historic
accord" and said that the pact would generate more than $1 billion in wages and
revenue for minorities by the year 2000. Despite the company's efforts with the
NAACP and $4.2 million of advertising meant to improve its image, the bad pub-
licity is still driving away customers and there seems to be little that the com-
pany can do to repair its image. For 1993, Flagstar reported a loss of $1.72 billion
on revenue of $2.97 billion, compared to a loss of $225 million only a year earlier.
See Jeff Borden, Chicago Ad Agency Hopes to Make its Name Polishing Denny's,
CRAnNs Cm. Bus., Feb. 14, 1994, at 41; Denny's Agrees to Bias Suits Settlement,
FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., June 16, 1994, at 426 E3; Chuck Hawkins,
Denny's: The Stain That Isn't Coming Out, Bus. Wy-, June 28, 1993, at 98;
Michael Posner, Secret Service Agents Accuse Denny's of Racial Bias, REUTER
Bus. REP., May 24, 1993, at 1; Paul W. Valentine, NAACP Signs Agreement with
Denny's, WASH. PosT., July 2, 1993, at Al; George White, Flagstar to Sell or Close
as Many as 180 Denny's and El Pollo Locos Restaurants: Virtually All Affected
Chicken Outlets are in Southland. Parent Company Will Take $1.7 Billion in
Charges, L.A. TnEzs, Jan. 25, 1994, at D1.
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the anti-discriminatory laws can either be frustrated by, or be con-
verted into instruments of, the very evil they are designed to pre-
vent."206 By focusing disparate treatment cases directly upon the
"ultimate question of discrimination vel non,"20 7 Hicks promotes the
careful and conscientious factfinding needed to administer Title VIrs
prohibitions on discrimination.
Ronald A Schmidt '95
206. Carter v. Duncan-H-iggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Scalia, J.,
dissenting)(quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
207. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983).
19941
